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“In the future, bodies will become increasingly insignificant – nothing more than a 
“costume,” a “vehicle,” something to be changed in our search “to become who we are.”    
                                                                                                (Orlan, My Body Is My Art 458) 
 
 
J.G. Ballard’s sci-fi novel Crash is a powerful – albeit highly controversial – 
depiction of man’s destiny in late industrial culture, “the destiny of [his] human body 
in a world of automotive disaster” and proliferating technology (Youngquist). It 
traumatically “crashes” the boundaries between bodies and machines, interior states 
of subjectivity and the external world, even the boundaries between fiction and 
reality, and depicts a ghastly marriage between sex and technology through the 
mediation of the metallic car-body – which, as Ballard points out in his “Introduction” 
to the French edition of the text, is portrayed in Crash “not only as a sexual image, 
but as a total metaphor for man’s life in today’s society” (Ballard 6). 
Thus the car in Crash functions as both sexual signifier – “the sexual act’s 
greatest and only true locus” (Ballard 171) – and as the centre point of consumerist 
desire in a materialistic, bourgeois society which is “ruled by advertising and pseudo-
events, science and pornography” (Ballard 4), a world, that is, in which values have 
crumbled and where all that is solid simply melts into air.1 In this world, everything 
becomes abstraction and surface, even the body. As Paul Youngquist points out, the 
body in Crash becomes surface upon its contact with the automobile, “a surface 
which, like that of the photographic image, lacks opposable interior and exterior.” For 
the body functions less as organic entity in the world of Crash than as abstract, 
conceptualized sign. Substance gives way to semiotics, “the vital, active organism 
gives way to the conceptual, abstract image”. According to Youngquist, once the 
body enters the interior of a car, it loses substance and “becomes the prosthesis of a 
speed machine,” a speed machine which transforms the body into “semiotic function,” 
  
an abstract sign in what Slavoj Zizek refers to as the “external, mechanical, symbolic 
order” which structures the text (qtd. in Seltzer 267).  
Along similar lines, Jean Baudrillard, in his compelling reading of Crash, 
remarks that “the entire body becomes a sign which offers itself in the exchange of 
body language.” There is nowhere any sense of the body’s organicity in this symbolic 
“exchange of body language” (that is, the exchange of signs which occurs between the 
body of the car and the body of the subject), not even when the body is impacted on, 
and thus transformed, by the automobile. As Baudrillard makes clear:  
 
It is all identical: all shocks, all collisions, all impacts, all the metallurgy of 
accidents is inscribed in a semiurgy of the body – not in anatomy or physiology, 
but in a semiurgy of contusions, scars, mutilations, and wounds which are like 
new sexual organs opened in the body. 
                                                                                  (Two Essays, emphasis mine) 
 
Divorced from any anatomico-physiological setting, the body is here grounded 
in a “semiurgy” or abstract system of signs. And, as the wound is part of the body, it 
too is subsumed into this system, becoming what Baudrillard calls a “symbolic” 
wound, one which is deinvested of libidinal cathexis and functions merely as abstract 
sign. 
It is certainly the case that there are multiple instances in Crash which would 
seem to corroborate Baudrillard’s claims of a “symbolic” wound, or what I would like 
to call a “wound-as-sign”. The text is richly strewn with wound imagery, the wound 
as planned, simulated, imaginary or real. From its very first chapter, it documents the 
principal character Vaughan’s fascination “with the mysterious eroticism (italics 
mine) of wounds” formed out of “the perverse logic of blood-soaked instrument 
panels, seat-belts smeared with excrement, sun-visors lined with brain tissue” (Ballard 
12). The wounds themselves are “mysterious” and have their own internal, linguistic 
code. Formed on the body by its impact with the metallic, interior surface of the car – 
  
“by shattering instrument dials, fractured gear levels and parking-light switches” – 
they are new signs waiting to be “read” and demystified, “a cuneiform of the flesh” 
(90) which is ready to unlock (once it is decoded) a new, affectless, even meaningless, 
sexuality borne out of the perverse union of flesh and metal.  
All the cuts, excisions and technical scars on the body are thus “templates for 
new genital organs,” exposed orifices in which are encoded multiple, sexual 
possibilities (Ballard 177).2 As the narrator Ballard points out in a moment when he is 
enacting wound sex with the young, crippled woman Gabrielle, their sexual act is 
devoid of all feeling or sexual pleasure. Like mechanical automatons, each explores 
the wounds of the other, both “deciphering together these codes of a sexuality made 
possible by our two car-crashes” (178-9). And it is the same with almost all sexual 
acts in Crash generally – they are “divorced from any possible physical expression” 
and intimacy (35), formal, mechanistic acts “abstracted from all feeling” (129).  
Thus the wound functions as an abstract, disembodied sign. As such, it is 
disseminated along the semiotic system like a signature, infinitely reproducible and 
infinitely prone to simulation. In Ballard’s emotionless encounter with Gabrielle, the 
“wound-scars on [his] chest and abdomen” which Gabrielle probes with her tongue 
are simply “signatures (italics mine), inscribed on [his] body by the dashboard and 
control surfaces of [the] car” (178).3 And, as Jacques Derrida aptly points out in 
Margins of Philosophy, signatures function only in so far as they are repeatable or 
“iterable”, and thus able to be repeated in several different contexts (that is, the very 
fact of the signature’s grounded repeatability ensures precisely that it can be repeated 
elsewhere). “In order to function, that is, in order to be legible, a signature must have 
a repeatable, iterable, imitable form; it must be able to detach itself from the present 
and singular intention of its production” (328). Hence a signature, like a wound, can 
be endlessly counterfeited, imitated and simulated. This is nowhere more powerfully 
depicted in Crash than in Vaughan’s constant reproductive simulation of injuries 
through the mediation of photographic images.4 In all his sexual acts he simulates the 
postures of wounded bodies as they are captured by his camera, “calculat[ing] the 
  
most elegant parameters of their injuries” and “mimic[king] these injuries in his own 
driving postures” (Ballard 145).  
Vaughan’s compulsive and incessant mimetizing of others’ wounds is 
particularly striking, if not ambivalent; it becomes uncertain whether, or rather to 
what extent, Vaughan is simply “mimicking” or has finally achieved what Seltzer 
identifies as that “mimetic coalescence of self and other: a mimetic identification 
intensified to the point of reproduction” (257). This ambivalence in Crash suggests 
that the boundaries between self and other no longer matter; they have been 
“coalesced” in the image of Vaughan (amongst others). Vaughan is his own 
photographic image, “both product and producer of other images. [He] is defined by 
the technologies of photography that condition his perception” (Youngquist). In so far 
as Vaughan’s self is subsumed within this technological other, the photographic 
image which conditions and defines his field of perception, he becomes a mere object 
caught up in a virulent reproduction or mimesis. As Seltzer aptly puts it: “To the 
extent that the mimetic compulsion resembles a photography at the level of the object, 
the boundaries come down between technical processes of reproduction and the life 
process” (184). And in Vaughan these boundaries have certainly come down. He is 
constantly rehearsing and mimetizing his own death, always preparing himself 
through mimicry for that ultimate moment in which life steps back and the flesh is 
brutally married to the car’s cold, metallic surface. Indeed, this is evidenced from the 
very first few lines of Crash, in which the narrator comments: “Vaughan died 
yesterday in his last car-crash. During our friendship he had rehearsed his death in 
many crashes (italics mine), but this was his only true accident” (7).     
 Yet while Vaughan is rehearsing his own death, he is also rehearsing the deaths 
of others, “dream[ing] endlessly of the deaths of the famous, inventing imaginary 
crashes for them” (Ballard 15). His obsession with his own death is inextricably 
linked to his frenzied desire to sexually collide in a car crash with the film actress 
Elizabeth Taylor, to “[die] at the moment of her orgasm” (9). An elaborate and 
fetishistic fantasy is thus woven around the images of famous celebrities, and the 
  
desire to unite with them in sexual death marks the complete process of identification 
with them. The celebrity functions as the idealized ego ideal in consumerist society. 
And, what is more, “the dead celebrity stands for the surrogate propitiatory victim, the 
“mirror image” whose failed sacrifice serves only to highlight the miserable charade 
of commodity culture” (Brottman and Sharrett).  
Thus as Mikita Brottman and Christopher Sharrett point out, there is an extreme 
investment of “violent eroticism, voyeurism, and obsessive curiosity” surrounding the 
body of a dead celebrity. In one of the narrator’s own visions, he imagines “the 
injuries of film actresses and television personalities, whose bodies would flower into 
dozens of auxiliary orifices, points of sexual conjunction with their audiences 
(emphasis mine) formed by the swerving technology of the automobile” (Ballard 
180). It is as if only through the celebrity’s death, both symbolically and literally, can 
there be a sought-for union between the celebrity and his/her audience.  
In effect, every car crash in the text – both real and imagined – becomes a 
shared event. The collision-site is like a proscenium, drawing crowds and crowds of 
spectators to witness its “bloody eucharist” (Ballard 157). The world of Crash is a 
stage, and on this stage are only cars infinitely involved in potential and actual 
collisions with each other. As the narrator points out, Vaughan envisions “the whole 
world dying in a simultaneous automobile disaster, millions of vehicles hurled 
together in a terminal congress of spurting loins and engine coolant” (16). In a similar, 
apocalyptic moment, the narrator watches the traffic going by from his veranda, 
“determined to spot the first signs of this end of the world by automobile” (50). 
“All the world’s a stage,” says the pessimist Jaques in Shakespeare’s As You 
Like It, “And all the men and women merely players” (2.7.139-40). When early on in 
the text the narrator Ballard crashes into another car carrying a young doctor with her 
husband, the collision kills the husband and Ballard feels that he and Helen 
Remington, the surviving wife, “[are] the principal actors at the climax of some grim 
drama in an unrehearsed theatre of technology, involving these crushed machines, the 
dead man destroyed in their collision” (Ballard 22). While the accident involves only 
  
“two” principle actors, the notion of a theatre, in which many spectators can gather to 
watch the effects of the collision, makes the accident appear more like a collective 
spectacle than a private ordeal. As Ballard points out, many spectators gather round 
the scene of the accident to watch this crash-event.  
 
As Seltzer documents in Serial Killers, there has come to be an increasing 
fascination with car accidents as forms of public display, a fascination which has led 
to the creation of what he calls a “wound culture”:  
 
The convening of the public around scenes of violence – the rushing to the scene 
of the accident, the milling around the point of impact – has come to make up a 
wound culture: the public fascination with torn and open bodies and torn and 
opened persons, a collective gathering around shock, trauma, and the wound. 
                                                                                                               (Seltzer 1)5 
 
And Crash is certainly a case in point. There, as we have already seen, the 
wound is not merely private but social, a public exhibit which is opened out for others 
to see and explore. It is not just a focal point highly invested with erotic desire, 
religiously admired to the point of mystic idealization,6 but a contact-point or switch-
point between inner and outer worlds. “The switch-point, or crash-point, between 
inside and outside is, above all, the wound” (Seltzer 264). And this is powerfully 
evidenced in Crash, where “the shock of contact between bodies and machines 
(eroticized accidents: real, planned, simulated) is also the traumatic reversal between 
private fantasy and the public sphere” (Seltzer 264-5). 
In other words, this collapsing between private and public boundaries is in itself 
traumatic, and this is borne out by the trauma of the wound itself, which serves as an 
ambivalent marker on the cusp between the private and the public, perception and 
representation. Yet, to begin with, “trauma” (taken from the Greek and meaning 
“wound”), the very notion of trauma itself, curiously wavers between the 
  
intrapsychical and the social, the physiological and the psychical. Thus while 
medicine had, in the main, recognized trauma as purely physical, Freud’s 
psychoanalytic framework brought psychical trauma onto the scene also, in the form 
of an “internal foreign body”, a shock to the system, which originates primarily from 
without and attacks – secondarily – from within. As he points out in Studies on 
Hysteria, the psychical trauma “acts like a foreign body which long after its entry 
must be continued to be regarded as an agent that is still at work” (qtd. in Laplanche 
42). Thus there is an internal-external bind or double logic here – what Laplanche 
cites as “a kind of internal-external instance” – in which trauma curiously wavers 
between inner and outer worlds (42). Thus while the shock of a car crash is an 
external event, the trauma (or rather the memory of the trauma) which it produces in 
the subject is at once physical and – although belatedly – psychical.  
I would like to hold on to this idea of trauma as wavering between the internal 
and external, since it is precisely this wavering or oscillation of trauma which, in my 
view, lends the wounds in Crash such an ambivalent status, making them appear at 
once psychical and social, virtual and real, a matter of both representation and 
perception at the same time. For while Youngquist and Baudrillard see the wounds in 
the text as primarily “symbolic” and semiotic, as disembodied artefacts or signs which 
circulate in “a semiotics without meaning” (Youngquist), the gaping wounds of the 
text seem to specify otherwise. For they may be abstract signs, but they are also 
embodied, “real” events. “They [describe] an exact language of pain (emphasis mine) 
and sensation, eroticism and desire” (Ballard 90).  
The body feels, even lives, pain. It is not so easy to abstract it from its 
materiality and root it in some conceptual or even pre-ontological discourse of 
semiotics. Indeed, the very question of semiotics, of language itself, presupposes the 
existence of the body, even if only as referential, material sign. As Jacques Lacan 
points out in Έcrits, “language is not immaterial. It is a subtle body, but body it is” 
(95). After Ballard’s crash, he is left with “the reality of the wounds on [his] chest and 
legs,” which serve as very real and unforgettable markers of the collision between his 
  
own body and the car’s interior (Ballard 37). As Ballard the narrator points out: “The 
crash was the only real experience I had been through for years. For the first time I 
was in physical confrontation with my own body, an inexhaustible encyclopedia of 
pains and discharges” (39, emphasis added).  
Wounds are “an inexhaustible encyclopedia of pains,” both part of a conceptual 
system of signs but also concrete markers of pain. And, as Vivian Sobchack points out 
in her criticism of Baudrillard’s reading of Crash, “there’s nothing like a little pain to 
bring us (back) to our senses, nothing like a real (not imagined) mark or wound or 
artificial orifice to counter Baudrillard’s postmodern romanticism.” The body is as 
much a subject as it is an object; it is all too easy to forget our lived and imagined 
sense “of the human body not merely as a material object among others, but as a 
material subject that bleeds and suffers and hurts for others because it can bleed and 
suffer and hurt for oneself” (Sobchack). While Sobchack’s argument may read like a 
nostalgic desire to recoup once more the body’s subjectivity, which (one may argue) 
has always already been disseminated and fragmented via artifice and technological 
practices, it is significant that she brings the notion of the material body to the fore 
once more. For Ballard’s Crash ultimately negotiates what happens to this material 
body in its constant mediation with the machine. As such, it is neither chillingly ironic 
nor even celebratory in its tone, only “cautionary” in its exploration of the limitless 
possibilities, many of them sexual, which are opened up by the body’s endless 
mediation with a constantly expanding world of technology: “Needless to say, the 
ultimate role of Crash is cautionary, a warning against that brutal, erotic and overlit 
realm that beckons more and more persuasively to us from the margins of the 
technological landscape” (Ballard 6). 
There is certainly an urgent (even inevitable) immediacy here: the technological 
landscape is constantly trying to impinge on the boundaries of the subject’s body, the 
boundaries of his consciousness and agency – and with much success. Yet to what 
extent the boundaries break down – and the consequences of this “breaking in” – is 
precisely what preoccupies Ballard. What happens when boundaries come down, 
  
when “the borderzones of identity” (Ballard 49) are blurred by the surrounding 
technoscape, and when flesh is violently married to chrome and metal? What 
possibilities will techno-sex, the ghastly union of sex with technology, ultimately 
unlock? There is simply no concrete answer to these questions – only an infinite 
number of possibilities.  
 The body’s mediation with technology both transforms (even cancels) it and 
prosthetically extends its possibilities ad infinitum. When Ballard has sex with the 
crippled Gabrielle, whose body is fitted in with a spinal brace and straps – she is, of 
course, the perfect image of the prosthetic other, her body completely mutilated and 
transformed by the metallic technology of the car – he feels her wounds not only as 
“templates for new genital organs,” but as “the moulds of sexual possibilities yet to be 
created in a hundred experimental car-crashes” (Ballard 177). Gabrielle’s wounds, 
formed by technology, open out an infinite plenitude of future possibilities; they are 
inexhaustibly iterable; erotic signifiers which are constantly circulating in the 
symbolic, technical economy of the text.  
And, as we have already seen, wounds are the switch-point between the inner 
and outer world, the public and private registers. They are as much social as they are 
private. As such, they do not meaninglessly circulate in this symbolic economy; they 
mark an event, a crash-event which in itself has made possible this endless circulation 
of erotic signifiers. And, what is more, it is precisely in this endless circulation that 
trauma is to be located. Hence the logic of trauma mimesis is played out. It is not 
simply that the wound-signs evidence the trauma; trauma comes back; it recurs in the 
circulation of wound-signs. More precisely, the recurrence of the trauma itself is 
traumatic in this endless circulation of signifiers.  
The erotic signifier is both transmitted and received, always reaching its 
“destination”, which is the unconscious. If, as Manuel Camblor illustrates, sexuality 
for Lacan is “the reality of the unconscious,” then “the eroticized emission and 
reception of a signifier […] effectively establishes an area of contact with the 
unconscious.” Camblor is, of course, referring specifically to David Cronenberg’s 
  
film Crash, and how the characters’ signifying wounds within the film could become 
traumatic if they are visually perceived and “received” by the spectator as erotic, if 
they succeed, that is, in reaching their destination and broaching the spectator’s 
unconscious. Yet while the spectators of the film may be in a potentially dangerous 
situation, in so far as they recognize these wounds as highly erotic and painful 
markers which can activate their own unconscious fantasies and desires, this is not to 
say that the protagonists in Ballard’s Crash are not confronted with the same 
dilemma. 
  As we have already seen, the wounds in Crash are highly charged with erotic 
energy. And, not only do they function as erotic signifiers, but they also have the 
potential to broach the subject’s consciousness in unexpected ways. When Ballard has 
sex with Gabrielle, he ejaculates on her wounds, and through “these sexual apertures” 
once more consciously relives (even reconfigures) the accident, “marrying through 
[his] own penis the car in which [he] had crashed and the car in which Gabrielle had 
met her near-death” (Ballard 179).  
Thus while the pain of the car crash is consciously real, there is a (conscious and 
unconscious) reactivation of the traumatic pain later on, the Freudian concept of 
Nachträglichkeit (deferred action). When Ballard has a sexual encounter with Helen 
Remington he unzips her dress, and the “razor-like links” of the zip against his flesh 
trigger off the memory of the trauma of the crash: “As these razor-like links cut my 
knuckles I felt her teeth across my ear. The sharpness of these pains reminded me of 
the bite of the windshield glass during my crash” (79). Quite clearly, this particular 
passage maps out the after-effects of the traumatic experience triggered by the crash 
itself, even if the pain evidenced here is physical rather than psychical. Trauma 
returns, violently reconfigured in the sexual act which takes place – significantly 
enough – in Ballard’s car, the new car he buys after the accident being an exact 
replica of the one destroyed in the crash. He remarks that “Catherine regarded with 
profound suspicion my choice of the same make and model as the car in which I had 
crashed. I had even selected the same make of wing mirror and mudguard spat” 
  
(Ballard 65-6). There is a repetition compulsion at work here, a kind of mimetic 
reduplication of the initial trauma – albeit in reconfigured form. As Ballard points out, 
he and Helen constantly replay the accident through their sexual acts:  
 
In each sexual act together we recapitulated her husband’s death, re-seeding the 
image of his body in her vagina in terms of the hundred perspectives of our 
mouths and thighs, nipples and tongues within the metal and vinyl compartment 
of the car. 
                                                                                                             (Ballard 83) 
 
Once again there is a mediation between the body and the machine, a splaying 
out of private desires onto “the metal and vinyl compartment of the car.” Yet there is 
also a reference to the initial trauma, which phantasmatically returns at the same time 
as it has made these sexual acts possible. Through the image of the husband’s dead 
body we are once more reminded of the fated accident which has brought these two 
key players of a gruesome drama, Helen and Ballard, together. Frenetically and 
repeatedly Ballard returns to the scene of the accident, rehearsing the route over and 
over again in a number of cars until his sexual act with Helen: “Was [Helen] aware 
[…] of the route I had rehearsed so many times in so many different vehicles, and that 
I had celebrated in her husband’s death the unity of our injuries and my orgasm?” 
(Ballard 75).  
Trauma effectively becomes both repetition and mimesis here. Ballard becomes 
what Seltzer refers to as “a duplicating machine” (258) that is “not merely subject to 
recurrence but to the recurrence of recurrence itself” (265). In other words, trauma is 
compulsive mimesis, and mimesis itself is always already mimetized. Ballard 
constantly reproduces the external event (that is, the car crash) which has initiated the 
trauma – if not in fact at least in fantasy. As such, his constant reproduction of this 
trauma marks the “traumatic “failure of his psyche to accept the fact of his own 
consciousness” – a failure which in fact J.G. Ballard registers as trauma mimesis: 
  
“Our traumas [are] mimetized” (in effect, the mimetic compulsion [is] mimetized) in 
the transfers between what is inside us and the machine” (265).  
Thus, simply because trauma is mimetized or simulated does not mean that it is 
any less poignant; in fact, it is its very mimetization which reproduces the trauma 
once more, “a trauma within a trauma”, trauma mimetized. Yet, on another level, this 
very mimetization of trauma has the curious effect of also dispelling, even 
obliterating, the trauma (an effacement which serves once more to reawaken the 
trauma in an endless, repetitive cycle). As Derrida has occasion to remark in one of 
his interviews, to date a work of art such as a poem is to inscribe it with a wound 
which is straightaway effaced, since the date itself marks the poem’s singularity as an 
event at the same time as that singularity is necessarily lost in the date’s very 
iterability. And this is the same for all experiences in general: 
 
Given that all experience is the experience of a singularity and thus is the desire 
to keep this singularity as such, the “as such” of the singularity, that is, what 
permits one to keep it as what it is, this is what effaces it right away.  
                                                        (Derrida, From Traumatism to Promise 378)7 
 
Thus, at the same time as the crash marks a singular event, this is precisely what 
constantly puts it under erasure. And, after all, car crashes are never quite singular 
events: they are iterable, repeatable, reproducible. The world of Crash is saturated in 
them (the crash as simulated, real, planned or virtual). They are infinitely desirable 
because of their ability to merge with the flesh and to create a new techno-body full of 
promise, opening itself out to a plenitude of techno-sexual possibilities. Thus, while 
the collapse of boundaries between the body and the machine registers a trauma, it 
also (paradoxically) breeds exciting, future possibilities. As Ballard points out in 
relation to wounds formed out of crashes, they are “contact points” which open out 
“all the sexual possibilities of [the survivors’] futures” (156). They are never entirely 
exhausted as (traumatic?) signifiers, constantly linking themselves onto other chains 
  
of imaginary, future signifiers. The narrator Ballard’s all-embracing vision of the 
“repertory of orifices” also encapsulates imaginary wounds which are yet to come in 
the distant future by way of “unimagined technologies”: “I visualized […] the wounds 
upon which erotic fantasies might be erected, the extraordinary sexual acts celebrating 
the possibilities of unimagined technologies” (179).  
The future is uncertain. The “nightmare marriage between sex and technology” 
breeds monsters (Ballard 6); indeed, the future is the monster. As Derrida points out, 
“the future is necessarily monstrous: the figure of the future, that is, that which can 
only be surprising, that for which we are not prepared […] is heralded by species of 
monsters” (From Traumatism to Promise 386-7). Yet this monster is somehow made 
“legible”: it is inevitably accommodated, acculturated, even normalized.  
As we have seen, the future opens out infinite possibilities, many horrific, others 
more promising. As Chris Gray points out in Cyborg Citizen, “the proliferation of 
cyborgs is the promise of monsters, the promise of possibilities. Horror is possible, 
perhaps inevitable. But resistance, even joy, should be just as possible” (195). 
Blurring and transgressing boundaries between machinic and life processes, the body 
and the machine, is both dangerous and exciting. Yet it can also be liberating, 
particularly if we are able (ideally) to “choose the borders we inhabit and transgress” 
(195-6).  
As Richard Sclove points out in Democracy and Technology, the political 
choices we make can lead to “a more democratic technological order” which 
enhances, even multiplies, our individual freedoms: 
 
It is possible to evolve societies in which people live in greater freedom, exert 
greater influence on their circumstances, and experience greater dignity, self-
esteem, purpose, and well-being. The route to such a society must include 
struggles toward democratic institutions for evolving a more democratic 
technological order. Is it realistic to envision a democratic politics of 
technology? Isn’t it unrealistic not to? 
  
                                                                          (Richard Sclove, qtd. in Gray 198) 
 
Certainly Sclove’s vision is idyllic, even nostalgic, but not impossible. While in 
his “Introduction” to Crash Ballard advises caution in sublating the boundaries of sex 
and technology, body and machine, he does not exclude the possibility that in the 
future modern technology may actually benefit us, “provid[ing] us with hitherto 
undreamed-of means for tapping our own psychopathologies” (6).  
Thus this is the ultimate, visionary role of Crash – to explore the new techno-
sexual possibilities which loom in the near-future horizons of the technological 
landscape. As Baudrillard points out, “Crash is our world” (Two Essays).  And, as our 
world, it explores our possibilities, showing that they are endless and positively 
limitless. Who knows what the future holds, what monsters and angels lurk within its 
unfathomable realm? We can only dream. And Ballard sums it up better than I can: 
“Over the profiles of [our bodies] now preside the metallized excitements of our 
shared dreams of technology” (41).  
* 
 
NOTES 
                                                 
1
 This is taken from Marshall Berman’s book entitled All That Is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience 
of Modernity (New York: Penguin, 1988). As Mikita Brottman and Christopher Sharrett point out in 
their article ‘The end of the road: David Cronenberg’s Crash and the fading of the West,’ in 
Literature/Film Quarterly 30:2 (2002):126-132, Ballard’s Crash is intensely preoccupied with the 
“commercial relationship between human and machine.” It maps out the decadence of late capitalism 
and consumerist culture, effectively portraying “a society obsessed with violence, brand names, 
destruction, machines, time, boredom, and repetitive sex, a society on the cusp of collapse into 
nihilistic dereliction and disaster.” This article is available in Literature Online 
<http://lion.chadwyck.co.uk> [accessed 11th June 2004].  
2
 Incidentally, this linkage between the wound and genital orifices is also attested to by Freud (who 
linked the wound to sexual difference) and clinical experience in general. As Armando Favazza points 
out in his Bodies Under Siege: Self-mutilation and Body Modification in Culture and Psychiatry, 2nd 
edn. (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996), skin-cutting is seen as “represent[ing] the 
creation of multiple little female genitalia on the skin,” which the subject can then fondle at will and 
touch unrestrainedly in order to gain sexual stimulation (163). While Favazza’s scope of reference is 
obviously very different, it is particularly interesting – perhaps even illuminating – to read the wounds 
or “cuts” in Crash as gendered in this way. There is certainly a sexual politics in the text which has 
often been missed, yet an examination of it is clearly beyond the scope of this paper.  
3
 Cf. Baudrillard in Two Essays: “And the copulations and semen which fill this book [Crash] have no 
more sensual value than the outlines of wounds have the value of violence, even metaphorical. They 
are only signatures.” 
4
 I use the term ‘mediation’ of the photographic image here rather deliberately. While for Baudrillard 
“the photo is no more a medium than is the technology or the body – all are simultaneous in this 
  
                                                                                                                                            
universe where the anticipation of an event coincides with its reproduction, and even with its “real” 
occurrence” (Two Essays), I read the photographic image as a medium which does not lack “depth” of 
affectivity simply because it is reproducible, but has the ability, through its mediation with the body, to 
“wound” or puncture it. As Roland Barthes points out in Camera Lucida (London: Vintage, 2000), 
there are certain photographs which have a punctum, a Latin word which “refers to the notion of 
punctuation” and serves to designate the mark or wound made by this sharp “element which rises from 
the scene [of the photograph], shoots out of it like an arrow, and pierces me” (26). Cf. Walter Benjamin 
in Illuminations, trans. by Harry Zohn (London: Fontana, 1992), where the camera is seen as 
“penetrating” into the unconscious, and drawing forth an “unconscious optics” which would otherwise 
have remained invisible to the naked eye: “Evidently a different nature opens itself to the camera than 
opens to the naked eye – if only because an unconsciously penetrated space is substituted for a space 
consciously explored by man” (230).  
5
 As Seltzer points out, this public fascination with wounds and violence has led to “a radical mutation 
and relocation of the public sphere, now centered on the shared and reproducible spectacles of 
pathological violence” (254). Yet, while there has been a growing “pathological violence” in the public 
sphere, this is not to say that public displays of violence did not exist before, only that perhaps there 
has been an increasing assimilation or pathologization of the violence itself. Note, for instance, Michel 
Foucault’s fascinating documentation in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. by Alan 
Sheridan (London: Penguin Books, 1991) of how in the early modern period pillory, scaffolding, and 
other forms of torture or execution had to be public events in order for the juridical system to work: 
“And, from the point of view of the law that imposes it, public torture and execution must be 
spectacular, it must be seen by all almost as its triumph” (34). While Foucault is obviously tracing a 
very different era, in which power was centralized around the sovereign state, this does not necessarily 
imply that the spectators constantly gathering around the scaffold to witness the spectacles of violent 
torture are in any way fundamentally different from the spectators gathering around the violent 
spectacle of the car crash. Who is to say, for instance, that the former did not find the public execution 
of the condemned man as fascinating? As liable to trigger within them a violent desire to simulate the 
torture in some form or other? Whatever the case, it must not be forgotten that in both instances the 
violence becomes a communal event in the (pathological) public sphere. All this is opposed, of course, 
to Jürgen Habermas’ notions of the public sphere as freely democratic and “the alternative to the 
sphere of public violence (the domain of the state and of the police)” (Seltzer 253).  
6
 The image of the wound itself obviously resonates with religious undertones. There are constant 
references in the text to the mysterious, mystic quality which the wounds exude. For instance, Ballard 
compares the wounds to “paradisial creatures” (198). Yet this mysticism is not specifically grounded in 
Christian doctrine. The wounds themselves have been begotten from the perverse union of the body 
with metal, sex with technology. As such, they are part of what Youngquist calls “a new semio-
gnosis,” of which Vaughan is the messiah. Wounds are simply signs which circulate in this “new 
semio-gnosis.” There is no question of transcendence, that is, the wounds on the body are not 
transcendental signifiers, or even signs in a play of signification for that matter. “Where once the 
rotting body of the crucifixion contained the play of signs, now the ruptured body of a crash multiples 
it.” 
7
 While there is certainly more to be said about Derrida’s notions of wounding and iterability, it is 
clearly beyond the scope of this paper to fully engage in Derrida’s philosophy of difference and 
deconstruction. Suffice it to say that for Derrida experience in general is always already marked 
(paradoxically) by both iterability and erasure, repetition and loss.  
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